U.S.-Asia Relations

This research theme tracks historical and present tensions between the United States and regional actors such as the Philippines, Japan, and China, exploring scapegoating and rival-making and their impact on regional stability. It provides descriptive and causal analysis of perception and reality in the American rival-making of Asian nations, past and present. 

This research is part of the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL).

Projects in this research track include:

A New Cold War? A Computational Analysis of Congressional Discourse on U.S. Rivals with the U.S.S.R, Japan, and China (Xinru Ma and Gi-Wook Shin)

It is often argued that we have entered, are entering, or will enter a new Cold War. But is this assertion empirically accurate? To answer this question, we analyze over 36 years of U.S. Congressional speeches, comparing the similarities and differences in discourses concerning China with ones concerning past rivalries between the United States and other nations, including Japan and the USSR.

By examining speech similarities, topics, and framings, we find that U.S. political discourses on China are more similar to those on Japan than those on the USSR across social, economic, and even ideological dimensions. These findings establish a baseline understanding of current U.S.-China relations and bear significant policy implications for China and the United States.

U.S. Rivals: Construct or Reality?

What motivates political elites to engage in discourses concerning foreign rivalries? Do they react to the behaviors — either threatening or positive — exhibited by these rivalries? Or do they construct perceptions of rivalries based on their states of insecurity and political agenda? Surprisingly, little research and analysis has directly assessed the impact of domestic dynamics on foreign policies. By applying computational methods to Congressional debates on past rivalries between the United States and regional actors such as Japan and China, we find that the U.S. Congress debates the two countries uncannily similarly. Moreover, rivalries are discussed in bland generalities, often as an empty signifier, a backdrop, or a scapegoat for domestic debates. We support the findings from our quantitative analysis by two in-depth case studies. 

Issue Attention and Rivalry Framing by Legislators, Presidents, and the Media

Using the latest computational and causal inference methods, we examine Congressional debates, presidential speeches, and media coverage of China from 2009 to 2023 to unravel the intricate relationship between political leaders and the media in shaping U.S. threat construction concerning rising powers. We aim to investigate causally whether political leaders primarily drive the media's narrative or if the media significantly influences political discourse in the context of U.S.-China relations. This analysis clarifies the role of political leaders' statements in the evolution of framing of perceived threats, specifically regarding who leads whom in agenda-setting and framing rivalries.  

Altogether, the projects in the U.S.-Asia Relations track aim to identify and contrast varying perceptions between the United States, its allies, and other regional actors in Asia, providing not only a descriptive analysis of threat perception by U.S. politicians and the public but also a causal analysis of perception and policy outcomes. Through these projects, we aim to contextualize the escalating tension between the United States and China, offer theoretical insights into threat perception and construction, advance methodological rigor in measuring threats and perceptions, and ultimately facilitate informed policymaking on effective engagement with rising powers.

The U.S. Alliance and Public Attitudes Toward China: Evidence from the Asia-Pacific Region (Gidong Kim and Gi-Wook Shin)

Research description
In recent years, scholars and policymakers have been paying close attention to the rise of anti-China sentiments worldwide. They tend to focus on factors related to China’s economic, ideological, and military threats. Thus, by stressing areas of threats from China per se, they do not fully appreciate the importance of larger international contexts such as the U.S. alliance relationships and U.S.-China tensions.

Yet, these larger international contexts matter because there is geopolitically important cross-national and temporal variation in public views toward China. For example, according to a recent Pew Research Center survey, anti-China sentiments have grown sharply in recent years in Europe, North America, and the Asia-Pacific region, where the United States has its allies. In contrast, public attitudes toward China are more favorable in Latin America and Africa.

How can we explain such cross-national and temporal variations? With proper attention to the larger international contexts, we analyze the role of the U.S. alliance relationship and the U.S.-China rivalry in shaping anti-China sentiments. Specifically, we argue that the growing tensions between the United States and China (the temporal variation) reinforce the role of the U.S. alliance in serving as a perceptual lens by which citizens of U.S. allies — but not those of non-allies (the cross-national variation) — view China based on a shared identity. By looking at the international and geopolitical contexts, we enhance the current understanding of the rise and growth of anti-China sentiments that have largely focused on the factors related to China itself.

Empirical findings
We test our argument in the Asia-Pacific region, where the United States has several allies and its tensions with China are most acute. Our analysis of two datasets — Gallup World Poll (2006-2022) and Asian Barometer Survey (Wave 3-5) — demonstrates that, as the U.S.-China rivalry grows, citizens of U.S. allies — but not of non-allies — are more likely to show unfavorable views toward China and exhibit contrasting attitudes toward the United States and China.

Policy implications
Our contribution to understanding the dynamics of public opinion in U.S. allies versus non-allies during the geopolitical crisis offers important policy implications for the United States, its allies, and China. First, the United States should recognize that the publics of U.S. allies not only form an alliance-based shared identity with the United States but also exhibit anti-Chinese sentiments based on the alliance relationship during the era of geopolitical rivalry. Therefore, because alliances can be an effective tool in containing China by influencing public opinion in U.S. allies, strengthening the relationship with allies can be more effective, particularly in the face of the intensifying bilateral tensions with China. 

Second, U.S. allies need to understand that the recently growing anti-China sentiments among their publics have, in large part, to do with the geopolitical context. In other words, such anti-China sentiments are unlikely to decline in allied countries unless the U.S.-China competition decreases.

Third, China needs to approach and address the recently rising anti-China sentiments as a geopolitical structural issue, rather than a public diplomacy issue. Although China actively uses diverse public diplomacy strategies, including financial and non-financial measures, to strengthen its soft power, such strategies may not work in U.S. allied countries. Because citizens of U.S. allies tend to exhibit unfavorable views of China based on their alliance relationships as the U.S.-China tensions intensify, the Chinese government should recognize that it would be difficult to mitigate those anti-China sentiments in U.S. allied countries unless its tensions with the United States weaken.
 

Democracy Versus Autocracy in Foreign Policy: Public Attitudes toward China in the Asia-Pacific Region (Gidong Kim and Gi-Wook Shin)

While the U.S. frames the growing geopolitical tensions with China as a strategic competition between democracy and autocracy, such a value diplomacy may have not been as effective in promoting liberal values as expected, especially in non-western regions. This is, we argue, because citizens in these countries, due to a relatively short democratic history, tend to understand democracy in terms of electoral institutions rather than liberal values, thereby limiting the effectiveness of U.S. value diplomacy.

To test our proposition, we analyze public attitudes toward China in the Asia-Pacific region, where the U.S.-China competition is most acute. Using a country-level cross-national analysis and an original survey experiment in South Korea, we find that China’s perceived threats to electoral institutions are more likely to generate unfavorable views toward the country than its perceived threats to liberal values. Our findings not only advance our understanding of the role of democracy in forming public opinion on foreign policy but also offer important policy implications for U.S. value diplomacy.

The U.S. Alliance and Public Attitudes Toward North Korea in South Korea (Gidong Kim and Gi-Wook Shin)

Recent studies demonstrate that alliance relationships, like other types of international entities such as the European Union (EU) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), can serve as a foundation of shared identity (i.e., the alliance-based shared identity), thereby forming the us-versus-them distinction. Yet, identity formation and operation do not occur in a vacuum. This study seeks to provide a more nuanced explanation of the operation of the alliance-based shared identity by accounting for domestic political dynamics.

In particular, this study focuses on how the U.S.-South Korea alliance and growing U.S.-China geopolitical tensions shape the public view of North Korea in South Korea. Since the United States has offered not only a security guarantee against the communist North but also economic support that helped South Korea accomplish both state-building and economic development, the U.S.-ROK alliance has played an important role as the foundation of South Koreans’ national identity (Shin 2010). In other words, the U.S.-South Korea alliance has not only shaped how South Koreans understand "who we are," but has also served as a lens through which they view North Korea and the United States. Therefore, because the role of such a perceptual lens can be amplified during times of geopolitical crisis, it is expected that South Koreans are more likely to exhibit unfavorable views toward North Korea as the U.S.-China tensions intensify.

Since democratization and the end of the Cold War, however, divergent views of the United States and North Korea began to emerge among South Koreans and led to the partisan divide in the early 2000s. The progressive government pursued the "Sunshine Policy" by assuming that North Korea was a reliable partner that would promote peaceful relations and eventually reunify with the South. In contrast, the conservative government was skeptical of North Korea and the Sunshine Policy. Moreover, during this critical period, the Bush administration’s tough stance against North Korea (e.g., the “axis of evil”) further strengthened the partisan debate over the meaning of North Korea. As such, at the center of South Korea’s partisan divide is the differing views on North Korea, which have largely originated from U.S.-ROK relations. Therefore, given the partisan divide, it is expected that conservative voters are more likely to exhibit unfavorable attitudes toward North Korea than progressive voters as the U.S.-China competition grows.

The U.S. Alliance and Public Support for Military Spending

Research description
Conventional wisdom suggests that citizens prefer ‘butter’ (i.e., social/welfare spending) to ‘guns’ (i.e., military spending). Recent studies, however, find that citizens’ military spending aversion weakens when they perceive external military threats directed toward their own countries. We argue that, in addition to direct military threat, indirect military threat perceived through alliance relationships can increase public support for military spending. Specifically, by focusing on the U.S. alliance and U.S.-China rivalry, we predict that citizens of U.S. allied countries are more likely to support military spending as they perceive China’s military threats in the context of the U.S.-China rivalry. Moreover, beyond the military threat, we expect the alliance-based shared identity to increase public support for military spending even in response to economic and ideological threats.

Empirical findings
To test our theoretical expectations, we first offer comparative evidence from public opinion survey analysis using the International Social Science Program (ISSP, the Role of Government module). Second, we conduct an original survey experiment in Japan and South Korea, the two U.S. allies in Northeast Asia.